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Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have proven to 
be a nagging headache if not an unmitigated disaster for the United States and its treaty allies, 
Japan and South Korea. Since declaring its intention to leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 
1994, North Korea has made steady progress toward developing a deliverable nuclear weapon, 
and the issue has cast a shadow over broader U.S. strategy in Northeast Asia.1 Indeed, at the time 
of this writing, the Hermit Kingdom has already conducted five nuclear tests and many fear that 
the North will soon test an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the 
United States West Coast.2 Each of these periodic nuclear and missile tests serve as reminders of 
both the urgency – and perhaps intractability – of the ongoing crisis on the Korean Peninsula as 
they represent continued progress toward a survivable, deliverable North Korean nuclear 
weapon.  
This thesis seeks to evaluate the relative merits of various policy approaches to resolving 
North Korea’s nuclear program. Can the U.S. persuade China to apply more pressure on the Kim 
regime in the form of sanctions and, if so, could more rigorous sanctions dissuade the North from 
its path to acquire nuclear weapons? If not, can the U.S. contain a nuclear North Korea, or should 
the U.S. and its allies resort to pre-emptive surgical strikes on the North’s nuclear program? To 
answer these questions, this paper will first assess the state of the literature pertaining to the 
North Korean nuclear crisis, evaluate the problem of North Korea’s nuclear program with respect 
to U.S. interests, and define the current administration’s objectives relative to the problem. The 
                                                 
1 "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," last modified October 25, 2016, Arms 
Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron. 
2 Steve Almasy and Joshua Berlinger, "North Korea calls ballistic missile test-fire a success," CNN, February 12, 
2017, accessed February 12, 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/02/11/asia/north-korea-missile/. 
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thesis will then detail three possible approaches to heading off a North Korean nuclear weapon – 
containment, negotiation, and pre-emption – and consider each option. This paper will use a 
framework that evaluates each policy’s efficacy, externalities, and cost. Efficacy refers to the 
likelihood that a policy will achieve primary U.S. goals with respect to the problem of North 
Korean proliferation, externalities refer to the positive or negative unintended consequences of a 
policy, and cost refers to the price in terms of blood and/or treasure that the U.S. will likely 
expend in pursuit of a given policy.3 Finally, the paper will settle upon the most tolerable option. 
This paper finds that containment through the policy of strategic patience represents the best 
policy for the United States. 
Literature Review 
 There is no shortage of literature related to the implications North Korea’s nuclear 
program; however, before reviewing existing literature on proposed policies to address North 
Korea’s nuclear program, it seems prudent to address the literature that connects North Korea’s 
nuclear and missile programs to U.S interests. Francis J. Gavin argues that preventing nuclear 
proliferation exists as a “third mission” of postwar U.S. grand strategy that exists on par with the 
two more widely acknowledged missions containing great power rivals and liberalizing the 
global economy. Gavin also lists several reasons for U.S. commitment to proliferation inhibition 
including the possibility that states use nuclear weapons against the U.S. either as a deterrent to 
constrain U.S. freedom of action or as a means of retaliation against U.S. actions, the prospect of 
other nuclear states using their nuclear weapons to compel U.S. involvement in a conflict, the 
                                                 
3 Meghan L. O'Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings, 2003), p. 32-35. 
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fear of a “nuclear domino” effect, and the hazards associated with nuclear failed states.4 
Although Gavin effectively details the U.S. interests at stake in preventing proliferation and 
persuasively asserts that proliferation inhibition has historically occupied a much larger role in 
U.S. grand strategy than previously acknowledged, he concludes his article by leaving the door 
open to future research on both the sustainability of the non-proliferation agenda and the 
appropriate responses to current proliferation hazards.5 This thesis will contribute to filling that 
research gap by applying Gavin’s list of threats arising from horizontal nuclear proliferation to 
the North Korean nuclear crisis and assessing potential solutions to these threats. 
 The first two threats to U.S. interests that Gavin identifies – nuclear aggression/blackmail 
and the use of nuclear weapons to draw the other powers into crises – are wholly dependent on 
the nuclear strategy that North Korea adopts upon achieving a nuclear weapons capability, which 
itself is dependent upon North Korea’s motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons. 
Interpretations of North Korea’s motive and likely use of a nuclear deterrent, however, vary. 
Some have observed North Korea’s behavior to date – particularly its use of provocations to 
bring the U.S. and R.O.K. to the negotiating table – and conclude that any North Korean nuclear 
strategy is likely to be characterized by brinksmanship and the pursuit of status-quo altering 
objectives.6 Others argue that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is rooted in defensive 
motivations for regime security and that its nuclear planning is likely to be highly risk-averse.7 
                                                 
4 Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation,” 
International Security (2015): p. 9-46. See also: Mark S. Bell, “Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear 
Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy,” International Security 40 (2015): p. 87-119. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Terence Roehrig, “North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and the Stability-Instability Paradox,” Korean Journal of 
Defense Analysis 28 (2016): p. 181-199. 
7 See: Kwang Ho Chun, “North Korea's nuclear question sense of vulnerability, defensive motivation, and peaceful 
solution,” Strategic Studies Institute (2010). Samuel S. Kim, “North Korea's Nuclear Strategy And The Interface 
Between International And Domestic Politics,” Asian Perspective (2010). 
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According to this narrative, the U.S.’s continued maintenance of forces along the 38th parallel, its 
engagement with South Korea through military exercises explicitly designed to foment regime 
change, and its treatment of Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya provide 
North Korea with compelling evidence against surrendering its nuclear weapons.8 Indeed, 
nuclear weapons may provide the Kim regime with security in more than one way. Given the 
immense sunk costs already invested in the nuclear weapons program, Kim may have no choice 
but to continue building nuclear weapons to retain the support of the North Korean military and 
bureaucracy and to maintain the legitimacy of the regime’s military-first (Songun) policy.9 Still 
others argue that the North Korean nuclear strategy will not become apparent until after the 
North Korean leaders themselves have experimented with nuclear weapons’ coercive power. 
Narang finds that North Korea will likely attempt to save resources by using its nuclear 
capability to compel China to intervene in crises on its behalf; however, if the North Korean 
leadership comes to find China’s response unsatisfactory, North Korea will transition to using 
nuclear weapons as a means of asymmetric escalation to terminate crises before the U.S. and 
South Korea can effectively exploit their conventional superiority.10 One near-universal 
shortcoming within the existing literature attempting to decipher North Korea’s nuclear 
motivations is the lack of clear and explicit implications for how the U.S. ought to head off 
North Korean proliferation or counter a nascent North Korean nuclear strategy. This thesis will 
                                                 
8 Bruce Klingner, "Respond Cautiously to North Korean Engagement Offers," Heritage Foundation, April 20, 2015, 
accessed November 15, 2016, www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/04/respond-cautiously-to-north-korean-
engagement-offers. 
9 Patrick DeRochie, "THE DRIVING FACTOR: Songun's Impact on North Korean Foreign Policy," International 
Affairs Review (Summer 2011): 1-18. 
10 Vipin Narang, “Nuclear Strategies of Emerging Nuclear Powers: North Korea and Iran,” The Washington 
Quarterly 38 (2015): p. 73-91. 
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draw on these varying interpretations of North Korean behavior to provide a strategy for 
containing a nuclear North Korea. 
 Much has also been written on North Korea’s third proliferation threat to U.S. interests: 
the potential for regional “nuclear dominoes.” Many have forecasted that North Korea’s 
neighbors – particularly Japan and South Korea – would find a nuclear North Korea intolerable 
and would face pressures to develop nuclear weapons of their own.11 This would especially be 
the case if North Korea acquired the means to reliably deliver a nuclear weapon to the U.S. 
mainland, as policy-makers in South Korea and Japan would begin to doubt whether the U.S. 
would “trade Honolulu for Seoul or Tokyo for Los Angeles.”12 Nonetheless, optimists maintain 
that the U.S. can head off cascading proliferation by targeting its allies’ fears of de-coupling and 
low-level “gray zone” provocations.13 Montiero and Debs argue that the U.S. can halt allied 
proliferation by using a carrot-stick strategy of assurances paired with the threat of de-coupling 
in the event of proliferation.14 These predictions and recommendations, while intuitively 
satisfying, fall short of providing the U.S. with a complete strategy for addressing North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons. For instance, neither Santoro and Warden nor Montiero and Debs consider the 
security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula in which North Korea views U.S. attempts to make its 
security guarantees more credible to Japan and South Korea as attempts to impose regime 
change, as detailed earlier in the literature review. As a result, these articles offer no way of 
                                                 
11 See: Mun Suk Ahn and Young Chul Cho, "A nuclear South Korea?" International Journal 69 (2014): p. 26-34., 
Stephen Cimbala, The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 
2015), accessed October 4, 2016, 149, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=uT5UBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA59&lpg=PA59&dq. 
12 Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon, "Should South Korea Go Nuclear?", NAPSNet Policy Forum, July 28, 2014, 
accessed October 2, 2016, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/should-south-korea-go-nuclear/. 
13 David Santoro and John K. Warden, “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” The 
Washington Quarterly (2015): p. 147-165. 
14 Nuno P. Montiero and Alexandre Debs, “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation,” International Security 39 
(2014): p. 7-51. 
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weighing the sometimes-conflicting goals of preventing allied proliferation and encouraging 
North Korean disarmament. This paper will attempt to offer a strategy for addressing both goals.  
 The final threat to U.S. interests comes in the form of North Korean state failure. Due to 
the inherently closed nature of the Kim regime, it is no surprise that there is no consensus on the 
state of its stability. On the one hand, North Korea is suffering from famine, a stagnant economy 
buckling under the weight of sanctions and poor economic planning, and rumblings of elite 
discontent in the wake of Kim Jong-un’s bloody takeover.15 Those predicting the Kim regime’s 
imminent demise argue that although the regime possesses a powerful propaganda machine, the 
Kims cannot divert attention from these severe domestic problems indefinitely. On the other 
hand, the Kims have proven remarkably resilient when faced with similar legitimacy crises such 
as the fall of multiple Communist governments in 1989, the deaths of Kim-Il Sung and then 
Kim-Jong Il, and the famines of the late 1990s.16 In stark contrast to those predicting the demise 
of the Kim regime based on the inevitable progress of history, supporters of the stable Kim 
regime hypothesis argue that the Kim regime has implemented a formula for successful 
authoritarianism by coercing foreign aid, silencing elite dissent, and “coup-proofing” the 
government bureaucracy through centralization of authority among the Kim dynasty.17 In this 
thesis I will address the possibility of a North Korean collapse as an unintended consequence of 
selected policies meant to counter North Korean proliferation and will weigh the cost of a North 
Korean “hard landing.” 
                                                 
15 Bruce Klingner, “North Korea Heading for the Abyss,” The Washington Quarterly (2014): p. 169-182. 
16 Jennifer Lind and Daniel Byman, “Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North 




 Given the severe and far-reaching implications of North Korean proliferation, a wide 
array of policy proposals has emerged to prevent the emergence of a North Korean nuclear 
weapon. One set of proposals argues in favor of imposing sanctions on North Korea that “target 
the survivability of the regime” with the intention of either compelling North Korea to give up its 
nuclear weapons or collapsing the Kim regime and reunifying the Korean Peninsula.18 For 
instance, Kydd proposes offering China assurances that a reunified Korea would remain non-
aligned in exchange for Chinese withdrawal of support for the Kim regime.19 Others dispute the 
effectiveness of sanctions in threatening the Hermit Kingdom. One study finds that four years 
after the United Nations Security Council approved resolutions 1695 and 1718 enacting far-
reaching sanctions on trade, finance, and travel with North Korea, only 83 of 192 nations had 
submitted implementation reports to the United Nations related to the sanctions by 2010.20 This 
suggests that many U.N. members lack the resources or technical know-how to enforce the 
sanctions and raises the prospect that the Kim regime may be circumventing sanctions that exist 
on paper. Another study questions whether sanctions can ever be truly threatening to North 
Korea due to the regime’s overt hostility toward economic liberalization and single-minded 
determination in seeking nuclear weapons.21 Indeed, sanctions may in fact help the Kim regime 
maintain its stability by closing off the country from outside influence and information. As part 
                                                 
18 See Mark Fitzpatrick, “North Korea: Is Regime Change the Answer?” Survival (2013): p. 7-20; Andrew H. Kydd, 
“Pulling the Plug: Can There Be a Deal with China on Korean Unification?” The Washington Quarterly (2015): p. 
63-77. Kim Jina, “UN Sanctions as an Instrument of Coercive Diplomacy against North Korea,” Korean Journal of 
Defense Analysis (2014): p. 315-332. 
19 Kydd, “Pulling the Plug: Can There Be a Deal with China on Korean Unification?” 
20 Masahiko Asada, “A Solution in Sanctions: Curbing Nuclear Proliferation in North Korea,” Harvard 
International Review (2011): p. 18-21. 
21 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Sanctioning North Korea: The Political Economy of Denuclearization and 
Proliferation,” Asian Survey (2010): p. 539-568. 
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of a broader search for a policy to address North Korean nuclear proliferation, this paper will 
assess the prospect of using sanctions to compel North Korean compliance. 
 If diplomacy and indirect encouragement of regime-change should fail, the U.S. will be 
forced to decide between containing a nuclear-capable North Korea and pre-emptively 
destroying the North’s nuclear weapons. Many have made the case for containment. At least one 
study maintains that the U.S. and allied forces retain a vast qualitative edge vis-à-vis North 
Korea and could easily repel any northern military aggression.22 Authors have argued that the 
U.S. and South Korea can build upon this advantage and deter a nuclear-capable North Korea by 
investing in ballistic missile defense, shoring up intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
capabilities, and maintaining a large force south of the demilitarized zone.23 Containment’s 
advocates tend to also favor retaining close consultation and assurance through existing U.S. 
alliances with Japan and South Korea to prevent a “nuclear domino” effect throughout Northeast 
Asia.24 Proponents of pre-emptive strikes against the North Korean nuclear program, such as 
Kwon, counter that although the U.S. and its allies may be technically capable of defeating or 
even deterring a nuclear North Korea, the prospect of a nuclear North Korea may unacceptably 
constrain U.S. and allied freedom of action in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula.25 
However, although both proponents of containment and pre-emption have devoted considerable 
attention to the resources needed to implement their respective strategies, only Kwon engages in 
any sort of cost-benefit analysis that considers these two strategies. In this paper I will attempt to 
                                                 
22 Michael O'Hanlon, “Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea Is Easier than the Pentagon 
Thinks,” International Security (1998): p. 135-170. 
23 See Brad Roberts, “Tailored Options to Deter North Korea and WMD Threats,” Korean Journal of Defense 
Analysis (2016): p. 25-31; Bruce Bennett, “Deterring North Korea from Using WMD in Future Conflicts and 
Crises,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (2012): p. 119-151. 
24 Santoro and Warden, “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age.” 
25 Edward Kwon, “The U.S.-ROK Alliance in Coping with North Korea’s Nuclear Threat,” Korean Journal of 
Defense Analysis 26 (2014): p. 496-497. 
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build on Kwon’s work by comparing the merits of containment with those of pre-emptive 
surgical strikes based on the consequences for regional and global stability as well as the 
financial and human cost to the United States and its allies.  
The Problem of North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs 
Since North Korea has left the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003, it has steadily marched 
toward achieving a deliverable nuclear weapon.26 Independent estimates from early 2015 
maintain that North Korea has enriched approximately 32 kilograms of plutonium, or enough to 
produce up to 10 small nuclear warheads.27 Most, if not all of the progress made on the 
production of weapons-grade plutonium has occurred at the nuclear research facility at 
Yongbyon, which features a 5MWe reactor capable of producing plutonium in reactions that use 
North Korea’s abundant natural uranium.28 North Korea’s uranium enrichment capabilities are 
less transparent; North Korea is known to have at least one centrifuge plant at Yongbyon with 
roughly 2,000 P2-type centrifuges, but some U.S. intelligence officials believe that North Korea 
has a second, hidden plant with a considerably greater capability.29 A high-end estimate holds 
that North Korea currently has enough nuclear material to produce a maximum of 22 nuclear 
weapons in total, each with a yield of 10 KT or 2/3 the size of the atomic bomb dropped on 
Hiroshima.30 If North Korea operates two centrifuge plants and its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon 
                                                 
26 "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," last modified October 25, 2016, Arms 
Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron. 
27 Ibid. 
28 "Yongbyon 5MWe Reactor," last updated September 30, 2011, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
www.nti.org/learn/facilities/766/. 
29 David Albright, "Future Directions In The DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Three Scenarios For 2020," 





with at least moderate success, North Korea will have fifty nuclear weapons by 2020 and will be 
able to produce eight additional nuclear weapons’ worth of fissile material each year thereafter.31 
North Korea’s short- and intermediate- range missile capabilities are far more advanced 
compared to its nuclear weapons program which gives North Korea the capability to 
accommodate many more warheads assuming it overcomes the barriers to warhead 
miniaturization. The Hermit Kingdom maintains approximately 1,000 short-to-medium range 
ballistic missiles, most of which are liquid-fueled and mobile. These missiles include the Nodong 
medium-range ballistic missile with a range of approximately 1,200 km, a large stockpile of 
Scud missiles that can hit targets 600 km away, and several Soviet-era light bombers.32  
Even North Korea’s existing nuclear program will inevitably pose challenges for U.S. 
interests. North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities may be limited in range at present, but 
they can still target – and therefore terrorize – Japan and South Korea. This has caused both 
allies to seek costly, functionally permanent extended deterrence guarantees from the United 
States.33 Continued failure to rein in North Korea’s nuclear program may also undermine the 
effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system. North Korea has already proven 
active in encouraging additional rogue proliferation; in September 2007 Israel destroyed a 
reactor that was likely part of a Syrian nuclear weapons program, and in 2013 a State 
Department brief concluded that North Korea had assisted in the construction of the reactor 
based on similarities in reactor design as well as evidence of the presence of North Korean 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 John Schilling and Henry Kan, "The Future of North Korean Nuclear Delivery Systems," 38 North, April 2015, 
accessed November 14, 2016, 38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF_Delivery-Systems.pdf. 
33 Santoro and Warden, “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age.” 
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cargo.34 Moreover, the North’s authoritarian political system carries the inherent risk of state 
failure and political instability which would raise the risk that the North’s nuclear weapons 
would be used by other actors. Although the Kim regime has proven resilient so far,35 past 
success is no guarantee of future stability. Short of full-fledged state failure, Kim Jong-un could 
sell nuclear weapons to terrorists or other states for funding during hard times.36 If the Kim 
regime were to encounter more serious problems – through coup or mass resistance – and other 
states proved unwilling or unable to secure the North’s nuclear weapons, then the weapons 
would fall into the hands of local warlords, who could then either use them to carve out spheres 
of influence in the remnants of a North Korean failed state37 or sell the weapons to terrorists for 
personal gain.38 North Korea’s current nuclear weapons program raises significant – but largely 
regionally contained – problems for U.S. interests. 
The continued progression of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs raises the 
much more chilling prospect that North Korea will one day possess a survivable nuclear 
deterrent capable of striking the continental U.S. While North Korea previously used its nuclear 
program as leverage, at times temporarily suspending the program to extract aid from the 
                                                 
34 Paul Kerr, Steven A. Hildreth, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear 
Cooperation (CRS Report No. R43480) (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 6-7, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43480.pdf. 
35 Jennifer Lind and Daniel Byman, “Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North 
Korea,” International Security (2010): p. 44-74. 
36 See: Graham T. Allison, "North Korea’s Lesson: Nukes for Sale," New York Times, February 12, 2013, accessed 
March 9, 2017, www.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/opinion/north-koreas-lesson-nukes-for-sale.html; Zachary Keck, 
"The Ultimate Nightmare: North Korea Could Sell Saudi Arabia Nuclear Weapons," The National Interest, June 22, 
2015, accessed March 9, 2017, nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ultimate-nightmare-north-korea-could-sell-saudi-
arabia-13162; for a more critical view on this subject, see: Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "Why States Won’t 
Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists," International Security, Vol. 38, no. 1 (Summer 2013): p. 80-104. 
37 Phil W. Reynolds, "What Happens if North Korea Collapses?" the Diplomat, September 3, 2016, accessed 
November 27, 2016, thediplomat.com/2016/09/what-happens-if-north-korea-collapses/. 
38 June Park and Jonathan B. Miller, “Is North Korea’s nuclear tech for sale?” East Asia Forum, November 3, 2016, 
accessed February 12, 2017, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/11/03/is-north-koreas-nuclear-tech-for-sale/. 
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international community,39 a North Korean nuclear weapon capable of striking the U.S. could 
cause the Kim regime to calculate that it can engage in lower-level hostilities under the shadow 
of nuclear escalation.40 Moreover, if North Korea proves capable of reliably targeting the U.S. 
homeland – be it Guam, Hawaii, or even the U.S. West Coast – South Korean and Japanese 
policymakers may eventually calculate that the U.S. would be unwilling to risk trading Honolulu 
for Seoul or Los Angeles for Tokyo.41 Such a calculation could even prompt these allies to 
pursue nuclear weapons of their own, sparking an arms race in an economically important, yet 
institutionally deficient, region of the world.42 
Luckily, North Korea remains several years away from a survivable nuclear deterrent 
capable of reliably targeting the continental U.S. due to multiple technological barriers. Although 
North Korea possesses numerous short- and medium- range missiles, its long-range missile 
capabilities are far more limited. If North Korea were to attempt to strike the continental U.S. 
today, it would only be able to field a militarized version of the Unha space launch vehicle. The 
Unha space launch vehicle does not pose a serious threat to the U.S., however, because the 
vehicle requires extensive above-ground infrastructure and preparation prior to launch, making it 
vulnerable to destruction before launch.43 Additionally, the Unha has only undergone limited 
testing and may not be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.44 Under a scenario of “steady 
modernization,” North Korea may be capable of fielding the KN-08 mobile ICBM in 
                                                 
39 Shane Smith, "North Korea's Evolving Nuclear Strategy," 38 North, August 2015, accessed November 14, 2016, 
38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF_Evolving-Nuclear-Strategy_Smith.pdf. 
40 See: Terence Roehrig, “North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and the Stability-Instability Paradox,” Korean Journal of 
Defense Analysis 28 (2016): p. 181-199. Matthew Kroenig, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A 
Future?” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, May 26, 2012, accessed October 4, 2016, 
http://npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&rtid=2. 
41 Hayes and Moon, "Should South Korea Go Nuclear?” 
42 Cimbala, The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy, 149. 




emergencies by 2020, granting North Korea a long-range deterrent explicitly designed to hit the 
U.S., but intelligence suggests that the missile is liquid-fueled which adds to the preparation time 
prior to launch and thus its vulnerability to pre-emption.45 More recently, North Korea appears to 
have achieved some success in the development of a submarine-launched ballistic missile which 
could also grant North Korea’s nuclear arsenal some survivability, though intelligence suggests 
North Korea’s submarines are ageing, noisy, and cannot remain far from home for long, which 
limits their threat to the continental U.S.46 Even after overcoming limitations in missile range and 
survivability, North Korea must still miniaturize and mount its warheads onto a missile and 
ensure that these warheads survive re-entry into the atmosphere in a reliable reentry vehicle. 
While it seems probable that North Korea is currently able to build a warhead small enough to fit 
atop a medium-range ballistic missile, it is unclear whether it can do so without significantly 
sacrificing the yield of the warhead.47 Additionally, North Korea has yet to demonstrate that it 
has a vehicle capable of surviving the heat and shock that come with atmospheric re-entry 
without relying on “blunt” re-entry bodies which are both inaccurate and vulnerable to U.S. 
missile defense systems.48 In short, North Korea’s long range strategic capabilities may give it 
the ability to introduce some uncertainty into a regional crisis, but its ability to deliver a nuclear 
warhead to the continental U.S. and escalate a conflict beyond Northeast Asia is far from certain. 
Consequently, U.S. extended deterrence guarantees will remain viable in the short- to medium-
term because North Korea will remain unable to deter or defend against U.S. intervention in a 
regional crisis. 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ju-min Park and Jack Kim, "North Korea fires submarine-launched ballistic missile towards Japan," Reuters, 
August 24, 2016, accessed November 14, 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-idUSKCN10Y2B0. 
47 Jeffrey Lewis, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: the Great Miniaturization Debate," 38 North, February 5, 2015, 




The Current Administration’s Goals 
 Early indications suggest that the current administration will not abandon the Obama 
administration’s goal of eventually denuclearizing the Korean. On the campaign trail Trump 
expressed a willingness to meet with Kim Jong-un and was quoted as saying 
I’ll speak to anybody. Who knows? There’s a 10 percent or a 20 percent chance 
that I can talk him out of those damn nukes because who the hell wants him to 
have nukes? And there’s a chance — I’m only gonna make a good deal for us049. 
Furthermore, President Trump noted the key role that North Korea’s patron state, China, would 
play in pursuing any negotiated settlement. This suggests that Trump shares the Obama 
administration’s early faith in the use of regional multilateral forums to encourage 
denuclearization.50 The Trump administration’s emphasis on China’s role in any negotiated 
settlement was put on display during Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s confirmation hearing in 
which Tillerson repeatedly criticized China for its “empty promises” to enforce international 
sanctions on North Korea.51 President Trump also implied that in the absence of Chinese 
assistance, the U.S. could solve the North Korean nuclear program, perhaps by force.52 Because 
Trump tweeted this message just prior to a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, one could 
read this as an attempt to coerce additional Chinese support for a diplomatic solution. The Trump 
administration has not yet abandoned the Obama administration’s hope for peaceful 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 
                                                 
49 John Power, "Trump’s Unlikely Rise Hints at Shift in US Policy on North Korea," The Diplomat, November 13, 
2016, accessed November 15, 2016, thediplomat.com/2016/11/trumps-unlikely-rise-hints-at-shift-in-us-policy-on-
north-korea/. 
50 Ibid. 
51 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Tillerson Confirmation Hearing, 115th Cong., 1st sess., 
2017, 1-6. 
52 Eugene Scott, "Trump: If China doesn't help, the US will solve 'the North Korea problem' without them," CNN, 
April 11, 2017, accessed April 17, 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/04/11/politics/trump-north-korea-china/. 
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 Recent talk of a potential North Korean ICBM test this year may have produced a 
corollary to the original goal of denuclearization. The Trump administration has suggested that in 
the absence of peaceful denuclearization, it is willing to prevent the deployment of a North 
Korean ICBM by any means necessary, including the use of force. As President-elect, Trump 
tweeted that a North Korean ICBM test “won’t happen.” While some have interpreted the tweet 
as a lack of faith in North Korea’s technical capability for such a test, others have read it as the 
creation of red-line for Trump.53 Trump administration officials, for their part, have reinforced 
the latter interpretation. When questioned about this tweet during his confirmation hearing, 
Secretary of Defense James Mattis maintained that although the administration would seek a 
negotiated solution to North Korea’s nuclear program, he was not willing to rule out the use of 
force to prevent the development of a North Korean missile capable of hitting the U.S. 
homeland.54 During a visit to South Korea, Secretary Tillerson stated that “all options are on the 
table” to prevent a North Korean nuclear deterrent.55 Despite an avowed hope for 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the Trump administration’s primary goal seems to be 
preventing North Korea from deploying a nuclear missile capable of hitting the U.S. homeland.  
The Trump administration also seems to share the Obama administration’s secondary 
goal of protecting U.S. treaty allies and containing the impact of North Korea’s existing nuclear 
program. Although Trump campaigned on an “America First” foreign policy – even suggesting 
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that South Korea and Japan should develop independent nuclear weapons capabilities56 – since 
his election he has focused much of his criticism on NATO.57 Trump was quick to meet with 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as President-elect, and following a North Korean missile 
test Trump stated that “the United States of America stands behind Japan, its great ally, 100%.”58 
In his first trip abroad as Secretary of Defense, Mattis argued in South Korea that “It is a priority 
for President Trump’s administration to pay attention to the northwest Pacific” and then 
expressed a desire to “work together and strengthen our alliance.”59 Despite campaign pledges to 
force Japan and South Korea to assume a greater share of responsibility for their own defense, 
high-level statements point to a more orthodox approach to managing the U.S. alliances vis-à-vis 
North Korea. 
Potential Policy Solutions  
 The Trump administration has essentially three options for confronting North Korean 
proliferation: continue the Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience,” convince 
China to support regime change, or roll back North Korea’s nuclear program by force. Of these 
options, strategic patience would appear to offer a the best policy with its moderate efficacy, its 
several positive externalities, its few negative externalities, and its relatively low financial and 
human cost. 
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 The Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience” amounted to a dual-track 
effort of ratcheting up pressure on North Korea in hopes of drawing the Kim regime back to the 
negotiating table while concurrently preparing a containment effort to deter North Korea from 
using its nuclear weapons to the detriment of the U.S. and its allies. The strategy has been 
marked by close alliance consultation with both Japan and South Korea including the large-scale 
deployment of U.S. conventional forces, and multilateral diplomacy – primarily through the 
United Nations – to bring comprehensive economic sanctions to bear against North Korea. Early 
indications, such as the Trump administration’s response to North Korea’s intermediate range 
ballistic missile test in early 2017, suggest that the Trump administration is so far likely to 
continue with “strategic patience” in practice if not in rhetoric.60 In this respect, there is room for 
improvement on the Obama administration’s foundation during the 45th President’s term, and 
this paper will consider several narrow but consequential changes to strategic patience as the best 
version of the option. 
 The military dimension of “strategic patience” was intended to achieve the secondary 
U.S. goal of deterring North Korea from engaging in nuclear blackmail vis-à-vis U.S. allies. The 
U.S. maintains approximately 80,000 troops forward deployed in Japan and South Korea: 52,000 
sailors and marines in Japan, and 28,500 airmen and infantry in South Korea.61 Although the 
forces in Japan are considered expeditionary, the primary objective of the forces in South Korea 
is defense against North Korean aggression. To this end, U.S. military forces in South Korea 
regularly engage in joint-military drills explicitly directed toward the North Korean threat with 
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their South Korean counterparts, such as Operations Key Resolve and Foal Eagle.62 To date, 
alliance cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea has typically followed a hub-
with-spokes pattern, with alliance consultations typically occurring through bilateral channels; 
however, the trio recently engaged in a trilateral missile defense drill alongside the RIMPAC 
exercises during the Summer of 2016 which suggests that strategic necessity has overcome at 
least some of the historical animosity between the two East Asian states.63 The Trump 
administration should expand on this foundation and establish an arrangement for trilateral radar 
data sharing between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. This would serve to unify two key 
“spokes” in the alliance and would provide the U.S. with integrated radar data across a wider 
geographic area, which in turn improve the efficiency of U.S. homeland missile defense systems 
against future North Korean ICBM threats.64 
 Comprehensive economic sanctions underpin the other dimension of “strategic patience” 
and constitute the primary means of pressuring North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons. 
The U.S. has maintained a comprehensive embargo on North Korea since the outbreak of the 
Korean War, and the United Nations has also implemented escalating sanctions after each North 
Korean nuclear test, starting in 2006.65 The current legal basis for U.S. sanctions on North Korea 
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is established by Executive Orders 13466 and 13722, which declared North Korean nuclear 
proliferation a “national emergency” and transferred authority over North Korean sanctions from 
Trading With the Enemy Act authorities to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).66 
These orders prohibit U.S. persons from exporting, importing, or initiating new investment into 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and grant OFAC the authority to prosecute U.S. persons 
who facilitate transactions between North Korea and third parties.67 Significantly, however, 
secondary sanctions have not been applied to several Chinese firms known to have engaged in 
business with North Korea.68 Unlike primary sanctions barring U.S. persons from business 
dealings with North Korea, secondary sanctions on foreign persons or firms that have dealt with 
the Kims are not automatically enforced and must be affirmatively and specifically designated by 
the Secretary of the Treasury.69 The Trump administration should build upon the current 
sanctions regime by applying secondary sanctions to third-country firms that continue to do 
business with North Korea, and increasing the flow of information into North Korea by 
exploiting vulnerabilities in the North’s cell phone system, which could allow the rapid 
dissemination of information from the outside world very rapidly.70 
These sanctions are ostensibly meant to serve as leverage in any future nuclear deal. The 
Obama administration laid out two official positions on any nuclear negotiations with North 
Korea. First, the North must demonstrate its commitment to denuclearization prior to 
negotiations. Second, former Secretary of State John Kerry suggested that a deal with North 
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Korea might resemble the Iran deal reached in 2015.71 This statement, plus strategic patience’s 
heavy reliance on sanctions suggest that a nuclear deal with North Korea reached through 
strategic patience would entail a suspension of U.N. sanctions related to North Korea’s nuclear 
program in exchange for North Korean assent to dismantle its current nuclear weapons and 
decommission its nuclear infrastructure. 
 Instead of strategic patience, the Trump administration could also explicitly and actively 
pursue regime change with Chinese cooperation. Some have proposed that the U.S. and China 
could reach a deal in which China withdraws support for the Kim regime in exchange for U.S. 
assurances that the newly reunified Korea would remain non-aligned and free of U.S. military 
presence.72 In such a deal, China could cut off food and energy resources, which might then 
foment internal unrest in North Korea and prompt collapse of the North Korean government. 
China would also offer the North Korean elite political asylum to accelerate the process and 
ensure a smooth transition.73 The U.S. and South Korea would first work to convince China 
during negotiations that the potential and consequences of future North Korean instability is 
greater than the potential for migration during reunification. After the imposition of Chinese 
sanctions, the U.S. and South Korea would simply wait for the North to collapse. After the 
Northern collapse, South Korea and China would then move to secure the border and former 
North Korean state. The U.S. would contribute up to 10,000 personnel to secure weapons of 
mass destruction. The U.S. would use use teams of approximately 200 special forces operators to 
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raid and secure potential WMD sites.74 Once political stability is restored in the North, the South 
Korean government would initiate an inclusive referendum to produce a new government and the 
United States would withdraw its forces from South Korea. After reunification, Korean 
nationalism would serve to enforce the Peninsula’s neutrality. Koreans would almost certainly 
resist Chinese attempts to leverage its economic ties with the Peninsula, and both the Korean 
right and left would probably resist the deployment of U.S. forces in the absence of a North 
Korean threat.75 The Trump administration could seek an understanding with China on 
reunification of the Korean Peninsula, which could end the North Korean nuclear program. 
 Finally, the United States could engage in a series of military strikes against North 
Korea’s nuclear facilities to disarm the regime. Under this option, the U.S. would undergo an air 
campaign using stealth aircraft and cruise missiles to target known nuclear weapons development 
and storage sites. Open-source intelligence can provide a list of clear above-ground targets 
including the nuclear research facilities at Yongbyon and Pyongson, the uranium mines across 
North Korea’s northern border, and North Korea’s several missile bases.76 While classified 
intelligence assessments would surely supplement this rudimentary list of targets in reality, it is 
not possible to consider these assessments in this paper. The U.S. could successfully eliminate 
these known nuclear and missile facilities using a mix of up to 24 regionally-based F-22 tactical 
fighters equipped with Joint Direct Attack Munitions, 10 B-2 bombers equipped with the 
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Massive Ordinance Penetrator bomb, and up to 600 Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles 
launched from just two Ohio-class submarines.77  
 In the immediate aftermath of a strike on North Korea’s nuclear program, the U.S. would 
need to deter or defeat any North Korean counter-attack. The effort to deter North Korean 
retaliation would rely upon the implicit threat to pursue regime change and reunification by force 
if Northern retaliation exceeds acceptable losses to the U.S. or its allies.78 This threat would be 
backed up by existing U.S. and South Korean ground forces south of the de-militarized zone 
(DMZ), U.S. naval and Marine presence in Japan and Guam, and the threat to invade with more 
troops from the U.S. homeland. If the deterrent threat were successful and Kim were to choose 
not to escalate, the U.S. and South Korea would retain the ability to engage in strikes against the 
Kim regime in the future.  
If North Korea were to escalate after U.S. strikes, the U.S. would assume operational 
control of the South Korean military and would then prosecute a broader campaign seeking to 
overthrow the Kim regime and reunify the Korean Peninsula.79 This campaign should start with 
U.S. air strikes on North Korean artillery and missile bases using less advanced A-10 and F-16 
fighters currently stationed at Osan and Kunsan airbases.80 These strikes would attempt to limit 
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the effect of North Korea’s artillery while U.S. and South Korean ground forces advance North. 
U.S. Marines on Okinawa would conduct flanking operations, and U.S. special forces would 
seek to dismantle the Kim regime.81 Crisis diplomacy with China, which likely would have been 
initiated during if not before the original U.S. strikes, would be necessary at this point to prevent 
Chinese intervention on North Korea’s behalf. In the event of deterrence failure post-strike, the 
U.S. and South Korea would seek to reunify the Korean Peninsula by force. 
Assessing Strategic Patience 
 From the outset, the Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience” does not seem 
likely to succeed in halting or even slowing North Korea’s march toward a nuclear deterrent. 
Indeed, the policy emerged in the wake of the failures of both the Six-Party Talks, which were 
discontinued in spring of 2009, and the 2012 Leap Day Deal, under which the United States gave 
North Korea 240,000 tons of food aid in exchange for a cessation of work on nuclear facilities at 
Yongbyon and on which Kim Jong Un quickly reneged.82 After these bitter failures, the Obama 
administration calculated that it had little to gain and much to lose politically by pursuing 
diplomacy with the Kim regime. Consequently, there have been no official negotiations with 
North Korea over denuclearization.83  
Furthermore, even if negotiations were to resume, it seems unlikely that North Korea 
would give up its nuclear program given present circumstances and the United States’ official 
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diplomatic position. Although former Secretary of State has suggested that a nuclear deal with 
North Korea might be modeled after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,84 colloquially 
known as the Iran Deal, North Korea has little incentive to give up its nuclear weapons in the 
status quo and every incentive to continue proliferation; the North’s economy is far better 
adjusted to international isolation, its nuclear weapons have already been built, and it expended 
far more resources in constructing its nuclear weapons compared to the Islamic Republic.85 
Indeed, the economic sanctions imposed so far appear to be a paper tiger. One study finds that 
despite the existence on paper of far-reaching sanctions on trade, finance, and travel, only 83 of 
192 nations had submitted implementation reports to the United Nations related to the sanctions 
by 2010 which suggests that many U.N. countries lack the resources or technical know-how to 
enforce the sanctions.86 Moreover, even if sanctions were to be effectively enforced, it is unclear 
whether these sanctions could ever persuade the Kim regime to give up nuclear weapons. The 
Kim regime has proven ambivalent if not overtly hostile towards economic liberalization, and its 
disregard for the welfare of its own citizens has not raised any visible domestic opposition.87 In 
fact, sanctions may even help the Kim regime to maintain its legitimacy by restricting the 
amount of outside information entering the country.88 The Kim regime elite could continue to 
survive through drug smuggling, illicit weapons sales, and counterfeiting just as it always has.89 
It is currently unlikely that North Korea would agree to dismantle its nuclear weapons in 
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exchange for sanctions relief and as a result, “strategic patience” is unlikely to achieve the U.S.’s 
primary stated goal of preventing North Korea from developing a nuclear missile capable of 
hitting the United States.  
 Despite strategic patience’s failure to contain North Korean nuclear and missile 
proliferation so far, the policy has in many ways laid the groundwork for helping the U.S. and its 
allies to live with North Korean nuclear weapons in the short- to medium-term future. While the 
North may continue to engage in provocative action, much to the chagrin of policymakers in 
Japan and South Korea, some analysts suggest that U.S. nuclear guarantees have ensured that 
North Korea’s provocations remain in the “gray-zone” to avoid triggering a major armed 
conflict.90 North Korea continues to face steep hurdles to creating a credible nuclear deterrent. 
North Korea’s long range missile capabilities remain untested, all of its known long range 
delivery systems under development have long windows of vulnerability to U.S. or allied pre-
emptive strike, and its re-entry vehicles are inaccurate and vulnerable to U.S. national missile 
defenses.91 As a result, North Korea is not likely to have a survivable nuclear deterrent capable 
of striking the U.S. homeland for at least another ten years, even assuming that no significant 
breakthroughs in U.S. missile defense technologies occur during that time.92 This mitigates the 
fear that Japan or South Korea might face nuclear proliferation pressures of their own because 
neither state will have to worry about whether the U.S. would trade Seoul or Tokyo for Honolulu 
or Los Angeles. Nuclear weapons mounted to regional ballistic missiles would certainly enhance 
North Korea’s ability to cause destruction in the region, but the North can already do tremendous 
damage using its conventional artillery. Perhaps more importantly, the Kim regime seems to 
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have calculated that until and unless North Korea acquires the capability to reliably strike the 
U.S. homeland, any aggression beyond the gray-zone would prompt U.S. retaliation which 
would almost certainly spell the end for the Kim regime.93 The greatest potential threat to U.S. 
interests – the prospect that North Korea develops a reliable nuclear deterrent – is currently far 
enough away that strategic patience will continue to be a workable alternative for at least the 
next decade. 
 Due to this long time horizon, strategic patience may yet prove effective. North Korea 
could, as Obama administration officials gambled, experience significant domestic political 
change during this time which would make the regime more amenable to denuclearization. For 
example, some have noted that globalization has begun to reach North Korea through trade with 
China. If North Korean citizens’ knowledge of and access to the outside world grows large 
enough, it may cause them to feel a sense of relative deprivation foster discontent with the Kim 
regime.94 Even if this discontent does not result in revolution, it could certainly result in 
moderation of the North Korean leadership. The Obama administration’s policy of strategic 
patience seemed to rely on faith that a more globally integrated, moderate North Korean regime 
might be more tempted to accept a “sanctions relief for disarmament” nuclear deal for which 
strategic patience calls.  
While perhaps too early to definitively rule out, the notion that North Korea might 
eventually pick economic growth over security by giving up its nuclear weapons currently seems 
unfounded. North Korean leadership believes that nuclear weapons provide security from regime 
change in a way that economic growth cannot. North Korea’s perception that the U.S. disposed 
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of Gaddafi in Libya even after Gaddafi had ostensibly renounced the Libyan nuclear program in 
the interest of promoting economic growth heavily reinforces this belief.95 Fortunately, strategic 
patience does not necessarily need to rely upon hope that North Korea will eventually collapse. 
Investing in additional homeland missile defense capabilities and pursuing trilateral missile 
defense cooperation with Japan and South Korea, as outlined in the previous section, would 
enhance deterrence contra the North by deepening strategic ties between the allies. 96 Continued 
bilateral and trilateral military exercises – particularly rehearsals of OPLAN 5015, which centers 
on pre-emptively destroying North Korean nuclear missiles – will also improve inter-operability 
and improve alliance ties.97 Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that even in a worst-case 
scenario in which North Korea develops the capability to reliably target the U.S. homeland, U.S. 
extended deterrence guarantees to Japan and South Korea can and should still persist. China’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons has not voided the U.S. defense commitment to Japan or even 
Taiwan, so it stands to reason that a nuclear North Korea with a comparable nuclear arsenal 
would not necessarily require South Korea or Japan to develop nuclear weapons of their own, 
provided that the U.S. clearly demonstrates its commitment to maintain the status quo.98 
Strategic patience should not rely upon blind faith that North Korea will collapse on its own; 
should the Trump administration continue strategic patience, it should seek to buy more time and 
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actively prepare to contain regional proliferation through expanded alliance coordination on 
missile defense. 
 Strategic patience has had several positive externalities from the U.S. perspective. The 
alliance with the U.S. has emboldened South Korea to play a more global security role. South 
Korea has generally provided a relatively large number of forces to international peacekeeping 
missions for a country of its size, and it has supported U.S.-led initiatives such as the 
reconstruction effort in Afghanistan and counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden.99 This 
support has the effect of granting many U.S.-led operations legitimacy by mitigating the 
perception that the U.S. is acting alone. It is likely that if the United States did not provide 
security guarantees to South Korea, the South would be forced to re-orient its military units 
currently devoted to global security missions back toward peninsular operations to meet the 
North Korean threat on its own.100 Strategic patience and U.S. military presence in South Korea 
more specifically enable South Korea to contribute to the provision of global public goods. 
 Strategic patience has also served to mitigate tension between South Korea and Japan. 
The two countries have historically maintained a tense – if not openly hostile – relationship. 
South Korea is perhaps naturally inclined to view Japan with suspicion due to the harsh 
conditions that the former endured under Japanese colonization from 1910 until the end of the 
Second World War.101 This suspicion can sometimes manifest itself in disputes over “history 
issues.” Most recently, the two countries prosecuted an extensive diplomatic row over 
conservative Japanese textbooks’ treatment of the Japanese Imperial Army’s use of Korean 
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“comfort women.”102 U.S. alliance ties to Japan and South Korea, however, allow the U.S. to 
play a role in mediating these disputes and ensure that disputes remain limited by giving the U.S. 
unique leverage.103 The hidden implication is that neither Japan nor South Korea can afford to 
escalate historical arguments beyond words lest the U.S. view them as an instigator and side with 
their opponent to the detriment of more important security needs.104 In this sense, U.S. uses 
alliance ties to ensure that the two countries focused on a common threats – North Korea – 
instead of coming to view each other as threats.105 This U.S. role has had tangible results: South 
Korea and Japan have participated alongside one another in several trilateral military exercises 
and jointly engaged in a trilateral missile defense exercise at RIMPAC 2016.106 Termination of 
strategic patience – either through retrenchment or elimination of the North Korean threat – 
would compromise this arrangement. Strategic patience’s emphasis on the maintenance of close 
alliance ties to both Japan and South Korea serves to mitigate tensions between the U.S.’s two 
East Asian allies. 
 Certain elements of “strategic patience” have had the negative externality of creating 
stress in the U.S.-China relationship. The U.S. views Chinese support for the Kim regime as 
hostile to U.S. interests. In his opening statement at his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State 
Rex Tillerson repeatedly criticized China for failing to uphold its commitment to impose 
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substantial sanctions on the Kim regime.107 For its part, China fears that cutting off all support to 
the Kim regime could result in a U.S.-aligned unified Korea on its doorstep. China also views the 
closer alliance ties between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea as intended to contain Chinese 
power. China has cited missile defense as a particular concern; it views the high-intensity radars 
mounted to theater missile defenses as a threat to its second-strike capability and perceives 
missile defense deployments as a larger step toward expanded alliance cooperation.108 In 
response, China has undertaken a dramatic nuclear modernization program including the 
development of anti-satellite, hypersonic glide, and multiple independently targetable re-entry 
vehicle (MIRV) systems—though it remains in question whether China’s linkage of missile 
defense and nuclear modernization is sincere.109 Scholars of China’s nuclear program have 
argued that China’s nuclear modernization does not represent an attempt to overcome U.S. 
missile defenses but rather a bid to achieve technological parity with the West.110 Efforts to 
increase U.S. and allied security vis-à-vis the North Korean nuclear threat may have come at the 
expense of security between the U.S. and China, but Western analysts should take care not to 
substitute their own strategic beliefs for those of China’s leadership. 
 While the fiscal cost of strategic patience is not insignificant, it is far more efficient than 
many critics assert. The bulk of the costs come from the cost of military basing in the Pacific and 
the cost of procuring additional military equipment to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat. 
The costs of the former are much lower than many realize; because Japan and South Korea front 
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50% of basing costs in their respective countries, the U.S. pays only $2 billion to base troops in 
Japan and $900 million to base troops in South Korea annually, and ongoing base construction 
projects in the Asia Pacific will collectively cost the U.S. no more than $7 billion by their 
respective completion times.111 Not all of these troops are exclusively dedicated to confronting 
North Korea; a substantial amount of U.S. troops in Japan would remain to respond to Chinese 
territorial expansion in the South and East China Seas. Although procurement costs for theater 
missile defenses are not insignificant – THAAD cost $24 billion in total to develop and purchase 
– these figures represent a sunk cost; the U.S. would still have needed THAAD technologies in 
other regions even if North Korea did not exist as a dilemma in U.S. foreign policy.112 The same 
goes for the missile defense-capable Aegis destroyer program. A more representative statistic 
would examine the annual operating costs of theater missile defense; the X-Band radars 
deployed to Japan cost approximately $60 million per year to operate,113 and the deployment of 
THAAD to South Korea will likely cost $1.3 billion per year.114 In short, strategic patience is not 
cheap and may not immediately result in the rolling back of North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program, but it offers the potential to contain North Korean proliferation in the future.  
Coordinated Reunification? 
 Instead of waiting for existing sanctions to precipitate regime change in North Korea, the 
U.S. could proactively seek reunification of the Korean Peninsula with South Korean and 
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Chinese cooperation. Under this arrangement, China would cut off all support to North Korea 
and offer political asylum to the North Korean elite to foment reunification, South Korea would 
assume political control of the North and would shut down the North’s nuclear weapons 
program, and the U.S. would withdraw its forces from the Korean Peninsula upon 
reunification.115 Such a deal could prove satisfying to all three participants. 
 China’s interests on the Peninsula may complicate the efficacy of a deal on coordinated 
reunification. China has so far proven hesitant to apply comprehensive pressure to compel its 
neighbor to give up its nuclear program because it perceives a destabilized or collapsed North 
Korea to be more dangerous than a nuclear North Korea. China’s priorities on the Korean 
Peninsula, as defined by Xi Jinping, are “no war, no instability, no nukes,” in that order.116 If 
North Korea were to collapse, its existing nuclear weapons and materials could be diverted to 
hostile actors,117 and a wave of migrants might attempt to move northward which would stress 
the Chinese economy.118 Collapse of the Kim regime would also necessarily complicate China’s 
use of the North as a buffer between itself and the U.S. If South Korea were to renege on a 
coordinated reunification deal and absorb. North Korea while still aligned with the U.S., it could 
place U.S. ground troops on China’s doorstep. China fought the Korean War to prevent exactly 
this scenario.119 Even if U.S. troops were to depart from South Korea after reunification, China 
would lose a valuable diversion to U.S. attention and resources, and China would have no 
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guarantee that U.S. forces would not be reassigned to containing China elsewhere in the 
region.120 These concerns could hurt the prospects for Chinese follow-through on any deal. 
A deal with the U.S. and South Korea on reunification would therefore have to be 
designed to mitigate these concerns. The U.S. and South Korea might try to convince China that 
although the Kim regime has so far avoided widespread discontent despite the suffering and 
impoverishment of its people, China has no guarantee that the Peninsula will remain stable in the 
future. If many analysts are to be believed, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program will increase 
the probability of catastrophic conflict involving North Korea, which would inevitably result in 
instability on China’s doorstep.121 This possibility would quickly disappear if South Korea were 
to assume control of the North. Reunification would also benefit the Chinese economy. 
Reunification would quickly raise the incomes of North Korea’s 25 million residents, which 
would boost trade between China and the newly reunified Korean state. This additional trade 
would be especially welcome because the gravity model suggests that gains from trade would 
likely be disproportionately concentrated within China’s troubled Northeast region.122 The U.S. 
would, however, encounter steep barriers to assuring China of its intention to leave the Korean 
Peninsula non-aligned. This deal represents an obsolescing bargain for China insofar as China 
would have very few options for dislodging U.S. troops if the U.S. were to renege and retain its 
alliance with South Korea. In this regard, the U.S. faces a credibility gap. China believes that 
NATO expansion after the collapse of the Soviet Union violated the spirit of a Soviet-NATO 
agreement not to deploy forces in East Germany which may complicate a negotiated settlement 
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in Korea even though the deal did not prohibit such expansion.123 This gap in trust could be 
overcome if the U.S. and China could agree to undergo a phased process in which the U.S. 
would gradually withdraw military presence and China would gradually escalate its economic 
sanctions. China’s security concerns could be addressed under the framework of an agreement to 
reunify the Korean Peninsula.  
South Korea would stand to gain the most from reunification. Collapse of North Korea 
would almost immediately remove the principal threat facing South Korea today. Although 
reunification does have the potential to be costly, a study by the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics suggests that both North and South Koreans would stand to benefit 
from reunification if the economic gap between North and South Korean citizens was closed 
through migration, rather than through private investment.124 One barrier to South Korean 
acceptance of such a deal is South Korean citizens’ overwhelming embrace of a cautious 
approach to reunification. One 2014 survey found that 70.5% of South Koreans favored 
reunification “dependent on circumstance” compared to 18% of South Koreans who favored 
reunification “as soon as possible.”125 That so many South Koreans favor reunification 
“dependent on circumstances” reveals that the real debate over reunification is over means, not 
ends. The means question is where reunification becomes divisive. Some in South Korea believe 
that rebuilding the North’s moribund industry would pose unacceptable economic burdens on the 
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South. 126 More immediately, however, South Korean support for reunification without a U.S. 
alliance could be shaken if North Korea could not be absorbed without significant bloodshed.127 
Even though a deal to reunify the Korean Peninsula would benefit South Korea the most in the 
long run, many practical barriers would need to be resolved to gain South Korea’s approval. 
Of course, the most important reaction in this equation is also the least predictable; 
Chinese pressure could prove insufficient to cause the collapse of the Kim regime. While 
Chinese sanctions would most certainly be painful – trade with China accounts for 90% of North 
Korea’s trade and provides the North with otherwise scarce energy resources – the North has 
historically proven extremely resilient to famine, resource shortages, and poverty.128 North 
Korea’s domestic political context is also not conducive to revolution or rapid regime collapse, 
the threat of which would be necessary to compel North Korea’s leadership to surrender to 
China. North Korea’s civil society can be neatly divided into three categories: the bureaucracy, 
the military, and the rural majority. The Kim regime would likely pass on the burden of deep and 
comprehensive Chinese sanctions onto the rural majority, who have few opportunities to 
organize against the Kim regime and who therefore do not currently represent a serious threat.129 
Some lower members of the North Korean elite may suffer, but most of the Kim regime would 
pass the welfare costs of sanctions onto the peasantry and maintain its luxurious lifestyle through 
drug smuggling, counterfeiting, and illicit weapons sales.130 Even if China, South Korea, and the 
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U.S. could agree to the terms of a deal on reunification, it is by no means guaranteed that the 
North Korean regime would crumble.  
Complications could arise even if sanctions were to prove effective in turning the military 
and bureaucracy against the Kim regime. North Korea might use or threaten to use its existing 
missiles and nuclear weapons in a desperate bid to compel the U.S., South Korea, and China to 
reverse the new sanctions. In theory, the U.S. would not have withdrawn its troops from South 
Korea until the latter had successfully absorbed the North; however, the U.S. may be forced to 
withdraw certain parts of its military presence from South Korea before the North’s collapse to 
build trust with China.131 The U.S.’s scheduled deployment of THAAD has proven controversial, 
and China may demand that the U.S. stop the project as part of any deal on reunification.132 
Without a missile defense shield, South Korea would be much more susceptible to North Korean 
nuclear and missile threats and a crisis involving these threats might shake South Korea’s 
support for coordinated reunification. A crisis might also convince China that the risks of North 
Korean instability outweighed the benefits of reunification and U.S. withdrawal. After the 
imposition of sanctions, North Korea would likely precipitate a crisis that could in turn unravel 
even meticulously planned reunification.  
Coordinated reunification could also create several negative externalities. In the process 
of collapse, Kim Jong Un or rogue elements of North Korea’s military might sell nuclear 
technology, fissile material, or even nuclear weapons themselves to terrorists or other rogue 
states to bring much-needed revenue to shore up the Kim regime. For instance, some have 
speculated that if Saudi Arabia’s security outlook deteriorates, it might offer North Korea oil in 
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exchange for nuclear weapons technology.133 Indeed, North Korea has already demonstrated a 
willingness to assist other rogue states in constructing nuclear infrastructure. After investigating 
a 2007 Israeli strike on a Syrian nuclear reactor, the State Department concluded that North 
Korea had likely assisted in the construction of the Syrian nuclear reactor given similarities in 
the reactor’s design to North Korean nuclear reactors.134 North Korea also came to be known as 
“Missiles R Us” in some intelligence circles due to its willingness to sell missiles to Syria, Iran, 
and Pakistan.135 It is not difficult to imagine that financial desperation produced by Chinese 
sanctions would cause North Korea to seek other beneficiaries. Sale of nuclear technology to 
terrorist groups would enter uncharted waters in international affairs. While some maintain that 
states would never sell nuclear weapons to terrorist groups for fear of attribution and 
retaliation,136 many have nonetheless speculated that sanctions-induced desperation could drive 
North Korea to sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations.137 Those arguing that North Korea 
might sell its nuclear weapons to terrorists have pointed to North Korea’s production and tests of 
bombs that primarily use highly-enriched uranium, which is much harder to detect compared to 
plutonium.138 The possibility that North Korea might sell its nuclear weapons in response to 
escalating sanctions does, however, create a sense of urgency for sanctions proponents; if 
sanctions are imposed while North Korea still has relatively few nuclear weapons, North Korea 
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will be less likely to sell its nuclear weapons because the marginal value of each of the North’s 
nuclear weapons will be greater than any of the North’s potential buyers’ willingness or ability to 
pay. If China agreed to cut off support to North Korea with the goal of collapsing the Kim 
regime, North Korea could respond by selling its nuclear weapons to other actors, multiplying 
the global proliferation threat.  
An observer may reasonably conclude that Sino-U.S. relations would improve because of 
a deal to coordinate reunification. The North Korea problem has long been a thorn in the side of 
Sino-U.S. relations, and the issue seems set to deteriorate as North Korea develops a more potent 
nuclear arsenal. If, however, China were to enforce sanctions on North Korea as fully as 
possible, it would be fulfilling both Secretary of State Tillerson and Secretary of Defense 
Mattis’s calls for China to carry its burden under international law.139 Because of the high stakes 
involved for both countries, successful reunification could also create positive perceptions of the 
other as worthy negotiating partners. 
Unfortunately, reunification would probably create more questions than answers for the 
Sino-U.S. relationship. If the North Korea threat were to disappear, the U.S. would be hard-
pressed to justify its large-scale military presence elsewhere in the region, particularly in Japan. 
The U.S. has so far used the North Korean threat to argue that the Pacific Rebalancing is not 
intended to threaten China; absent the North Korea threat, Chinese policymakers could more 
easily portray the pivot as an attempt to contain China’s rise. China has also historically used 
North Korea as a bargaining chip in bilateral diplomacy. North Korea offers the Chinese a 
problem that only China can solve, which allows Chinese leaders to use North Korea as a 
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diversion to deflect U.S. criticism or pressure on a host of other issues from Chinese territorial 
expansion in the South China Sea to Chinese human rights abuses.140 Without North Korea as a 
distraction, U.S. policymakers might feel emboldened to challenge China on these other issues, 
which would confirm Chinese leaders’ suspicions that the U.S. seeks to contain China’s rise. The 
U.S. and China would likely struggle over the details of the implications of a post-North Korea 
regional order which could intensify existing stresses in the diplomatic relationship. 
The financial and human costs of a reunification deal would largely depend upon how 
negotiations define the U.S. military’s role in achieving reunification itself. That result will in 
turn depend upon China’s competing desires to rid the Peninsula of U.S. forces and avoid a 
costly intervention, South Korea’s willingness and ability to contribute forces to a reunification 
mission, and the U.S.’s willingness to accept the risks of offloading WMD acquisition missions. 
Regardless of how these countries agree to share the burden, analysts estimate that stabilizing a 
post-collapse North Korea would require between 200,000 and 400,000 ground forces, with 
direct costs comparable to both the second Iraq War and the U.S. War in Afghanistan combined, 
or roughly $1 trillion.141 These troops would be divided into several categories: stability 
missions, border control, elimination of WMD, disarmament of conventional weapons, and 
defeat of military resistance. By examining these missions, a likely division of labor emerges. 
South Korea would probably spearhead stability missions, southern border control, disarmament 
of conventional weapons, and defeat of military resistance because of its location and large 
amount of forces in theater give it an inherent advantage in these areas. South Korean leadership 
in these missions would also serve to establish the Korean Peninsula’s autonomy. China would 
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assume responsibility for securing North Korea’s northern border since it already has troops that 
have trained and prepared for such a contingency.142 The U.S. should specialize in elimination of 
North Korean WMD since it has the best intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
capabilities of these three countries, and since the U.S. would be most threatened if a terrorist 
group stole WMD during the chaos of reunification.143 The cost of pursuing coordinated 
reunification largely hinges on the roles that U.S. forces play in providing security after the 
Korean Peninsula.  
If U.S. forces are predominantly assigned to WMD elimination missions, the U.S. would 
contribute up to 10,000 personnel. The closest point of comparison for such a mission might be 
the U.S. campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the cost of which approached $11 
billion at the beginning of 2016 and the lives of nine of the nearly 5,000 U.S. service members 
currently serving in Iraq.144 However, these costs might quickly rise if there are significant 
organized North Korean remnant forces. WMD elimination missions would account for the bulk 
of the financial and human cost to the U.S. of seeking coordinated reunification with China and 
South Korea. 
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Prospects for Rolling Back North Korea’s Nuclear Program by Force 
 The prospect of using force to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities has 
recently re-entered policy discussions. During his visit to South Korea, Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson announced that “all options are on the table” to stop North Korea’s nuclear program, 
including the pre-emptive use of force to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
facilities.145 Despite this renewed attention, this option faces serious technical and political 
challenges. The first and most obvious challenge would be eliminating enough of North Korea’s 
nuclear and missile capabilities to make such a strike worthwhile. North Korean air defenses 
cannot detect or defend against stealth aircraft, so U.S. B-2 bombers and F-22 strike fighters 
could operate relatively freely in North Korean airspace even without destroying North Korean 
air defenses.146 Notwithstanding this significant advantage, there is still no guarantee that the 
U.S. could eliminate North Korea’s nuclear arsenal in a series of surgical strikes on the 
program.147 Secrecy accounts for at least some of this difficulty.148 While the infrastructure that 
North Korea needs to produce additional nuclear weapons is readily targetable, the North’s 
existing nuclear weapons and delivery systems are well hidden. North Korea keeps its road-
mobile missiles on patrol almost constantly, and when its missiles are not on patrol they are 
hidden in bunkers.149 Since North Korea’s existing nuclear arsenal is currently small, it would 
not be difficult for the North to enact a similar rotation for its nuclear warheads. At a minimum, 
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however, North Korea probably keeps its nuclear warheads in its extensive labyrinth of bunkers 
and tunnels.150 The U.S. could adjust for this by striking targets suspected to be involved in 
North Korea’s nuclear program, such as the Geumchang-ri Underground Facility or a suspected 
bunker at Hagap, but broadening the scope of a military strike also raises the risk of escalation 
since a broader strike would be more likely to be misperceived by North Korea as an attempt to 
decapitate the Kim regime, especially if the strike included the several missile bases and rocket 
factories in Pyongyang.151 A limited military strike could do significant damage to North Korea’s 
nuclear and missile infrastructure; however, the U.S. could probably not destroy all of North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons and their delivery devices without raising the risk of escalation to 
unacceptable levels. 
 Even if the U.S. and its allies were theoretically able to destroy all of North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons and their delivery devices, a military strike would not end North Korean 
proliferation. North Korea produces the components needed for a functioning nuclear weapon 
domestically, so North Korea could simply rebuild its nuclear arsenal in the months and years 
after a strike.152 A strike would also further convince North Korean leadership of the necessity of 
its nuclear weapons, which would in turn complicate any future permanent political resolution of 
the nuclear issue.153 A U.S. strike limited to North Korea’s arsenal and known military nuclear 
facilities might slow – but not halt – North Korean proliferation. 
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 A U.S. strike on North Korea’s nuclear program could also complicate the goal of 
preventing war on the Korean Peninsula. If North Korea perceives U.S. strikes to be the first step 
in a broader invasion or an attempt to decapitate the Kim regime – due to fog of war or otherwise 
– it could retaliate using the full range of its remaining nuclear capabilities. After a strike, most 
of North Korea’s launch pads would be wiped out which rules out direct retaliation against the 
U.S. mainland at present, but North Korea could still target Seoul, Tokyo, or U.S. bases in the 
Western Pacific using road-mobile intermediate range missiles and/or nuclear-armed attack 
submarines.154 If North Korea feared regime change, it would probably strike one of these high 
value targets and then threaten further violence to force the U.S. and its allies to de-escalate.155 
The U.S. would have a very limited range of options to control escalation in this scenario. Even 
in a best-case scenario in which the U.S. successfully conveys to the North Korean leadership 
that the military strike is strictly meant to target nuclear facilities, North Korea might feel the 
need to retaliate using its artillery or cyber capabilities to prevent future strikes on its nuclear 
program. North Korea’s initial reaction might be limited to attempt to avoid escalation to a full-
scale war and to save ammunition – and thus leverage – in the hours immediately after the 
strike.156 This is especially the case since North Korea’s conventional artillery can be mobilized 
much more quickly than its nuclear forces.157 Nevertheless, even a “limited” North Korean 
reaction would have to be severe enough to deter future strikes on its nuclear arsenal and limited 
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retaliation would therefore result in an escalatory U.S. response.158 U.S. strikes on the North 
Korean nuclear program would almost inevitably result in instability on the Korean Peninsula. 
 Independent of the policy’s efficacy, eliminating the North’s nuclear program by force 
would create several negative externalities. China would be incensed if the U.S. undertook a 
military campaign to eliminate North Korean nuclear weapons without prior Chinese consent. 
The North Korean nuclear program provides China with both a diversion and leverage in the 
bilateral relationship because it represents “a problem that only China can solve.” In diplomacy, 
China can promise actions to rein in North Korea in exchange for U.S. cooperation on other 
issues of Chinese interests.159 Unilateral strikes would compromise this balance, so China might 
hesitate to cooperate with the U.S. on other issues on the bilateral agenda even in a best-case 
scenario in which the North Korean state remains largely intact and violence remains limited. A 
larger conflict would create proportionally larger problems for the U.S.-China relationship. On 
the one hand, China would likely hesitate to become directly involved in a military confrontation 
with the U.S. over North Korea, even if the North Korean state began to collapse.160 On the other 
hand, a collapsing North Korea would send a vast wave of refugees northward into China, and 
the prospect of a U.S.-aligned unified Korean Peninsula on its frontier would be intolerable for 
China.161 Both of these factors would intensify strategic rivalry and would at a minimum cause 
China to perceive the U.S. as a reckless superpower seeking absolute security at others’ 
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expense.162 Striking North Korea’s nuclear and missile program would antagonize China and 
hurt bilateral relations. 
 Attempting to destroy North Korea’s nuclear program could also strain relations with 
U.S. allies Japan and South Korea. Japan and South Korea would bear the brunt of the 
consequences of U.S. strikes because of their proximity to North Korea and the limited range of 
North Korea’s existing missiles.163 If a pre-emptive military operation against North Korea 
spiraled into an all-out conflict and citizens in Japan and South Korea saw the U.S. as the 
aggressor, the political foundations of each alliance would come under pressure. Evidence 
suggests that Japanese and South Korean citizens still do not favor conflict with North Korea. 
Japan’s Prime Minister struggled to gain support for the revision of Article IX of the Japanese 
Constitution to allow Japan’s Self-Defense Force to come to the aid of an ally if attacked, and 
despite official consideration of pre-emptive strikes by some military officials, South Korea 
appears likely to elect center-left candidate Moon Jae-in who favors greater diplomatic and 
economic engagement with the North.164 A 2016 poll of 1,010 South Korean citizens also found 
that 64.5% of South Korean citizens felt that “maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula” 
should be the primary purpose of U.S. military presence in the region compared to only 50.8% 
who expected the U.S. to “defend South Korea.”165 The Japanese and South Korean publics 
might view the U.S. as recklessly entrapping them into a dangerous and unnecessary conflict, 
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especially if North Korea were to retaliate by targeting civilian population centers in either 
country. However, even if North Korea did not retaliate at all, U.S. strikes could damage the 
North Korean reactor at Yongbyon which would expose the populations of both Japan and South 
Korea to a radioactive leak.166 U.S. military action against North Korea could harm alliance 
cooperation with Japan and South Korea, particularly if conflict were to erupt or if the North 
Korean reactor at Yongbyon were to become a radioactive health hazard. 
 Cost and casualty estimates vary widely because North Korea’s reaction is difficult to 
predict. Different estimates tend to assume different North Korean reactions to U.S. strikes. As 
mentioned earlier, since the U.S. would limit its targets to only nuclear weapons production 
facilities and some missile production facilities, it may be able to avoid full-scale conflict by 
convincing North Korean leadership of the limited goals of such an operation. Because North 
Korean leaders may understand that they would not be able to control any escalation, they may 
limit their response to gray-zone provocations such as cyber warfare.167 In this best-case 
scenario, strikes against North Korea’s nuclear facilities would cost the U.S. about as much as 
the 2011 air war in Libya, or approximately $1.1 billion.168 While the U.S. was responsible for 
only a fraction of strikes in Libya, the no-fly zone involved a protracted campaign to keep 
Gaddafi’s air forces grounded, rather than a single campaign to strike a series of hardened 
targets.169 The $1.1 billion baseline figure may increase to around $2 billion when one considers 
that the U.S. might opt to use B-2 bombers carrying Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs to 
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destroy hardened targets.170 In the highly unlikely scenario in which North Korea limits its 
retaliation to hostile rhetoric and perhaps a token cyber-attack, an operation to destroy North 
Korea’s nuclear program would cost the U.S. much less than $10 billion to prosecute. 
 However, North Korea will probably retaliate beyond gray-zone provocations even if the 
U.S. properly signals its limited intent. North Korean leadership would almost certainly face 
pressure to take serious retaliatory action to deter the U.S. and its allies from striking its nuclear 
program in the future because it views a nuclear deterrent as necessary for survival. Short of 
nuclear escalation, North Korea could use its artillery to strike targets south of the DMZ.171 Most 
North Korean artillery cannot reach Seoul, so it is more likely that North Korea would target 
U.S. and South Korean bases along the DMZ. Retaliation in this scenario would also be limited 
for several reasons. First, North Korea would not be able to use the full force of its artillery 
without placing these forces at serious risk.172 Second, North Korean leadership understands its 
conventional inferiority and would attempt to keep retaliation below the threshold of a full-
fledged conflict that the North would surely lose.173 Third, North Korea has a limited amount of 
artillery ammunition and short-range ballistic missiles in the short-term, so every piece fired 
proportionally reduces its ability to deter the U.S. and South Korea from escalating a conflict 
further.174 If conflict remained limited to a brief exchange of artillery fire, the entire conflict 
would not cost much more than the Persian Gulf War, or $102 billion in 2011 dollars.175 The 
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U.S. casualty rate, however, might be higher because North Korea would likely target military 
bases. North Korea might respond to surgical strikes on its nuclear program by using its artillery 
in a limited fashion to signal resolve and impose costs on the U.S. and South Korea. 
 In a worst-case scenario, North Korea might use its nuclear arsenal. This scenario seems 
more likely than the preceding scenarios for several reasons. North Korea could misinterpret 
U.S. strikes on its nuclear arsenal as an attempt to force regime change. If this were the belief, 
North Korea would use nuclear weapons early on to attempt to stop the dissuade the U.S. from 
pursuing regime change. Even if North Korea correctly perceived the limited nature of U.S. 
strikes, however, its leadership might use its nuclear or chemical and biological weapons to 
dissuade the U.S. from striking the North’s nuclear program in the future. North Korea might 
launch nuclear weapons at U.S. military bases in South Korea and use its remaining nuclear 
arsenal to threaten Seoul, Tokyo, or other U.S. bases to attempt to force the U.S. to back down. 
A successful North Korean nuclear attack on U.S. military bases in South Korea could cost the 
lives of up to 28,500 U.S. service members.176 Nuclear use – successful or otherwise – could 
make further escalation difficult to control and the U.S. would likely expand its war aims to 
regime change.177 General Curtis Scaparrotti, the commander of U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) 
testified before the House Armed Services Committee that the casualties and cost of a full-
fledged resumption of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula would be comparable to the first 
Korean War.178 That war cost the U.S. $341 billion in 2011 dollars and 36,914 U.S. lives – ten 
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times the amount lost in the 2003 Iraq War.179 Surgical strikes on North Korea’s nuclear program 
could inadvertently cause a resumption of full-scale conflict on the Korean Peninsula if North 
Korea mistook strikes as an attempt to dismantle the Kim regime.  
Conclusion 
 There is no perfect solution for North Korea’s nuclear program. In an imperfect world in 
which there are only bad options for the United States, strategic patience represents the best 
framework for approaching the Korean Peninsula in terms of efficacy, externalities, and cost. 
Table 1 summarizes these findings. This conclusion is based on the assessment that although 
strategic patience will probably not result in the de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula within 
the foreseeable future, the strategy is unlikely to create any major disruptions on the precarious 
Korean Peninsula. The risks of North Korean nuclear proliferation are simply not worth the risk 
of renewed conflict or instability on the Korean Peninsula. North Korean nuclear proliferation 
will be slow; as explained earlier, North Korea may gradually increase its ability to deliver a 
nuclear warhead to the continental U.S., but it will be well over a decade before North Korea has 
a credible nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis the United States.  
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 Strategic Patience Coordinated 
Reunification 
Surgical Strikes 
Efficacy Will not dismantle 
North Korean nuclear 
program; may result in 
North Korean ICBM; 
allows continued 
deterrence and 
assurance of Japan and 
South Korea 
May not gain Chinese 
support; Chinese 
sanctions may not be 
sufficient to collapse 
the North; successful 
reunification would 
end North’s nuclear 
threat 
Will not destroy many 
of North Korean 
nuclear weapons; will 
slow production of new 
nuclear weapons 






North Korea may sell 
its nuclear weapons; 
may damage U.S.-
China relations  
Serious damage to 
U.S.-China relations; 
strained relations with 
Japan and South 
Korea in the event of 
major retaliation 
Cost $900 million annually to 
base troops in R.O.K.; 
small fraction of 
$2b/annual basing cost 
in Japan; small fraction 
of theater missile 
defense procurement 
costs 
$11 billion for WMD 
retrieval missions; $1 
trillion total with 
R.O.K. bearing much 
of the burden 
Minimum $1.1 billion 
on top of annual costs 
of strategic patience; 
potentially $341 billion 
and 36,000 American 




 Strategic patience will probably not denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and North Korea 
may eventually develop an ICBM capable of hitting the U.S. homeland, which means that 
strategic patience will not achieve the primary goals of the Trump administration. Still, the 
alternatives to strategic patience unacceptably raise the risks of a major crisis on the Korean 
Peninsula in the short term and such a conflict would not be worth even the denuclearization of 
the Peninsula. None of the policies outlined in this paper will eliminate North Korea’s nuclear 
program without prohibitive negative externalities or costs. Coordinated reunification might have 
the greatest efficacy of all the options in that it would eliminate the North Korean threat, but it 
might also have the most detrimental negative externalities if the Kim regime were to lash out 
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against U.S.-aligned countries, if the Kim regime’s disintegration were to culminate in a bloody 
civil war, or if North Korean leadership were to sell nuclear weapons technology to other rogue 
states or terrorists. The surgical strike option would be ineffective and would come with 
significant externalities and costs. Surgical strikes on North Korea’s nuclear program would not 
permanently extinguish the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and risk permanently 
damaging U.S.-China relations or worse – catastrophic North Korean retaliation. Importantly, 
while neither of these options appear prudent in the short term, strategic patience does not 
necessarily foreclose either of these options if circumstances turn against the strategy. 
 The externalities of strategic patience also decisively weigh in favor of the policy. While 
strategic patience contains some elements that strain relations with China, relations have hardly 
approached a breaking point over North Korea despite more forceful U.S. rhetoric on the issue. 
Both the coordinated reunification and pre-emptive strike options, however, could strain 
relations in other more severe ways. Both the U.S. and China agree in principle (if not priority) 
that North Korea’s nuclear program is an issue. Removing that item from the agenda could cause 
the U.S. to re-focus engagement with China on other more contentious security issues such as 
human rights or the South China Sea. Dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program by force 
could also draw serious Chinese ire, especially if military action were to result in a U.S.-aligned 
Korean Peninsula. Since no policy on North Korea will decisively improve U.S.-China relations 
and the North Korean nuclear program is unlikely to fracture relations absent a disruptive event 
such as a war, risky departures from the status quo are not warranted. Strategic patience also 
serves to mitigate security rivalry between South Korea and Japan by aligning the two against a 
common threat in North Korea. Strategic patience offers a net safer world than the other options. 
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 Finally, strategic patience can be achieved at a low cost of blood and treasure compared 
to other options. Strategic patience’s primary costs come from U.S. military presence in the 
region, but Japan and South Korea contribute substantial amounts of resources to defray these 
costs. Coordinated reunification may reduce basing costs if it were to remove the need to 
maintain U.S. military presence in South Korea, but even successful reunification would not 
necessarily remove the need for military presence in Japan. This marginal cost reduction is not 
sufficient to justify risking a destructive conflict in Northeast Asia or North Korean sale of 
nuclear technology to other rogue states or terrorists. Pre-emptive strikes on North Korea’s 
nuclear program would not reduce basing costs at all because they would not decisively 
eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat. Moreover, pre-emptive strikes would pose an even 
greater risk of a conflict with North Korea that could cost the lives tens of thousands of U.S. 
service members, to say nothing of the catastrophic loss of life that would ensue if North Korea 
used nuclear weapons against Seoul or Tokyo in response to U.S. strikes. Table 1 summarizes 
the comparative efficacy, externalities, and costs of each policy. Strategic patience may not be 
the ideal arrangement for the United States in Northeast Asia, but it is more workable than the 
alternatives. 
 The Trump administration can take several steps both to improve the political viability of 
strategic patience and to mitigate the negative externalities associated with the policy. Despite 
Secretary of State Tillerson’s announcement that “the policy of strategic patience has ended,” the 
Trump administration has yet to materially depart from the Obama administration’s playbook in 
responding to North Korea. This gives the Trump administration significant flexibility in 
determining which aspects of the Obama-era policy to continue and which to de-emphasize. For 
example, Trump could portray his strategy as more muscular than strategic patience to domestic 
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audiences if he placed greater rhetorical emphasis on strategic patience’s efforts to contain North 
Korea. For example, Trump could point to implementation of secondary sanctions and greater 
alliance coordination on missile defense – in line with this paper’s recommendations – as a point 
of contrast with Obama’s strategic patience.  
While Trump might receive positive reactions from his own party, some of the defense 
investments outlined in this paper – especially improvements in U.S. homeland missile defense 
and long range conventional strike systems – may prove difficult to implement in Congress. 
Democrats in Congress have historically accepted that the U.S. homeland missile defense system 
can defend the U.S. from a small attack by a rogue state, but as North Korea’s nuclear arsenal 
expands questions might arise about the system’s technical capability and cost-efficiency.180 
Spending more money on capabilities meant to defend Japan and South Korea might also raise 
hackles among isolationist or libertarian-leaning elements of Trump’s base, especially after 
Trump criticized the two countries for failing to adequately finance their own defense.181 Neither 
of these obstacles are insurmountable, however, as Trump can ally with hawkish elements of his 
own party and point to North Korea’s expanding nuclear arsenal as rationale for expansion of the 
U.S. missile defense system. Strategic patience may not be a perfect solution to North Korea’s 
nuclear program, but it represents the least dangerous and most feasible means of living with the 
problem.  
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